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Labour markets across industrialised countries are under considerable pressure with 
governments implementing deregulating reforms in particular at the margins of the labour 
market, whereas regular workers have often seen very little decline in employment 
protection. Employers have been pushing hard for labour market deregulation, and it is 
therefore easy to see a government-business alliance at the heart of these developments. 
But where are trade unions in this process of labour market deregulation and dualisation? 
Insider/outsider as well as producer coalition approaches portrait organised labour as a 
structurally conservative force that prioritises the interests of labour market insiders, whilst 
sacrificing the interests of outsiders. Rather than protecting the working class, unions are 
seen as being ‘complicit’ in labour market dualisation that leaves an ever greater number of 
workers vulnerable. Our examination of the Korean case, though commonly perceived as an 
example of unions pursuing particularistic interests, does not comply with this image, but 
shows greater union inclusiveness in the face of socio-economic and socio-political 
challenges. Understanding Korean trade union strategies, we identify the critical importance 
of union identities shifting towards social movement unionism, in addition to the perceived 
imperative to re-vitalise the movement in order to remain a meaningful social force. 
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Organised Labour, Dualisation and Labour Market Reform: 
Korean Trade Union Strategies in Economic and Social Crisis 
 
Labour markets across industrialised countries are under considerable pressure with 
governments implementing deregulating reforms. The greatest deregulation can be 
observed at the margins of the labour market where the employment of atypical workers 
has become much easier, whereas regular workers have often seen very little decline in 
their employment protection (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Fleckenstein and Lee 2017). 
Unsurprisingly, employers have been pushing hard for labour market deregulation, as strict 
employment protection constrains business discretion undermining their ability to adjust 
employment levels to the business cycle. It is thus easy to see a government-business 
alliance at the heart of labour market deregulation driving labour market dualisation; that is 
the increased polarisation between labour market insiders and outsiders.  
But where are trade unions in this process of labour market deregulation and 
dualisation? Challenging the conventional wisdom of organised labour (in an alliance with 
left parties) pursuing the interests of workers (Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979), the literature 
increasingly portraits trade unions as structurally conservative forces that prioritise the 
interests of labour market insiders (the core membership of trade unions), whilst sacrificing 
the interests of labour market outsiders. In other words, organised labour is seen as readily 
accepting deregulation at the periphery of the labour market and greater insecurity for 
marginal groups in order to protect insiders. Rather than protecting the working class, trade 
unions are ‘complicit’ in labour market dualisation that leaves an ever greater number of 
workers in highly precarious situations (Hassel 2014; Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 2007).  
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Our examination of the Korean case, though commonly perceived as an example of 
trade unions pursuing particularistic interests (Kim and Lim 2000; Yang 2006), does not 
correspond with the depiction of insider/outsider and producer coalition theories. In 
exchange for consenting to labour market deregulation including the ‘sacrifice’ of insider 
rights, Korean unions achieved improved social protection, most notably for labour market 
outsiders (though still rather selective and modest social protection by international 
standards). In contrast to greater inclusiveness in social protection as facilitated by labour 
confederations, enterprise unions (especially, large ones) continue to prioritise insider 
interests at the workplace where outsider ‘exploitation’ is seen as stabilising the privileged 
position of insiders. Recently, however, we find some greater inclusiveness towards 
outsiders at the workplace as well, albeit without challenging the primacy of insiders. In 
awareness of the limits of enterprise unionism, union leaders have started pushing for a 
shift to industry unions for greater solidarity.  
In short, contrary to the image of conservative forces, we observe that Korean trade 
unions displayed a capacity to develop new strategies that not only aim at confronting the 
secular process of dualisation but also show increasing inclusiveness towards labour market 
outsiders. In the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and subsequent dualisation and rising 
social inequality, the democratic trade union movement’s identity as a social movement was 
critical for addressing Korean organised labour’s historically narrow focus on insider 
interests. The economic and social crisis allowed progressive union leaders to make their 
long-standing commitment to greater social solidarity a priority. In addition, more 
conservative forces in organised labour increasingly recognised the limits of previous 
industrial strategies and the imperative to revitalise the movement in order to remain a 
meaningful social force, not only in the face of declining membership but also increasing 
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public pressure. Yet, having said this, greater inclusiveness towards outsiders was limited by 
the institutional structure of Korean trade unions (that is, the predominance of enterprise 
unions) and hostile employers, which aggressively pursue dualisation for cost reasons.  
The article is structured as follows: We first review different theoretical perspectives 
on trade unions strategies and organised labour’s capacity to overcome historically 
established industrial and political strategies, before introducing the Korean labour market 
and social protection regime prior to democratisation in the late 1980s. In the third section, 
it is shown that unions, complying with insider/outsider theory, first prioritised the interests 
of labour market insiders in the democratic transition, whilst the following section 
demonstrates that trade unions, in the East Asian financial crisis (which is widely associated 
with labour market deregulation), started to display greater inclusiveness by pushing for 
better social protection for outsiders. In the aftermath of labour market deregulation, 
irregular employment and social inequality increased significantly; and we thus discuss trade 
unions’ responses to this dualisation of the Korean labour market, including union strategies 
towards better representing irregular workers in the workplace, as well as better 
representing them in public policy. Empirically, the article draws upon trade union and 
Tripartite Commission documents, in addition to 15 in-depth interviews with trade unionists 
from peak organisations, industrial unions and labour organisations representing irregular 
workers, and with academic members of the Tripartite Commission.  
Considering that Korean organised labour is commonly viewed as being rather 
particularistic, Korean unions might be considered a critical case for challenging 
insider/outsider and producer coalition theories (cf. Eckstein 1977; Gerring 2004). Also, the 
examination of the Korean case yields important insights into union agency in labour market 
and social welfare politics, as Korean unions, unlike their counterparts in the region, have 
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developed some significant impact on labour market and welfare reforms in economic crisis 
– challenging predominant ‘top-down’ approaches in East Asian political economy research 
(Deyo 2012). Put differently, in difficult times (when many might expect little room for 
progressive politics), unions can make a difference, as the Korean case exemplifies. This is 
not to argue that the social problems and challenges of dualisation have been successfully 
dealt with (certainly not), but that unions have the capacity to develop inclusive strategies 
that aim at social progress for all. 
 
Can Trade Unions Change: Caught in the Middle? 
Calling into question the traditional power resources approach that sees the interests of 
working people well represented by trade unions and their social-democratic parties 
building comprehensive social and employment protection (Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979), 
insider/outsider theory, as most prominently represented by Rueda (2007), assumes that 
insiders actually prioritise employment protection in order to maintain their insider status, 
whereas they see little benefits in unemployment protection and active labour market 
policy. Not only does unemployment protection primarily benefit labour market outsiders 
with their much greater risk of unemployment, it also requires greater social insurance 
contribution and/or tax from insiders – effectively reducing their net incomes. As far as 
training policies improving the employability of outsiders are concerned, these are seen as 
increasing competition for insiders, thereby putting downward pressure on their wages. 
Insider/outsider theory therefore sees the interests of these two groups in conflict, and 
assumes that trade unions, as well as social-democratic parties, readily sacrifice the 
interests of outsiders in order to protect those of insiders, their core constituency. In a more 
recent contribution, Emmenegger (2014) suggests that, despite not having a genuine 
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preference for exposing outsiders to greater insecurity, trade unions are prepared to agree 
to deregulation at the periphery of the labour market in order to protect their 
organisational interests (e.g. continued involvement in public policy-making). Although this 
approach is, somewhat confusingly, branded as ‘power resources’ thesis, it is essentially no 
more than a modification of insider/outsider theory. 
The assumed readiness of trade unions to expose poorly organised outsiders to 
greater employment insecurity leaves them open to ‘producer coalitions’ with employers. In 
particular, trade unions in manufacturing industries with strong export orientation are 
considered to benefit from the deregulation of atypical employment and associated labour 
market dualisation, making their companies more competitive and thus making their jobs 
safer, though at the expense of marginal groups in the labour market. In other words, trade 
unions are seen as being ‘complicit’ with employers and at the heart of increasing labour 
market polarisation and rising social inequality. Admittedly, different preferences of trade 
unions in the service sector are acknowledged, but these unions are not seen as having the 
political clout of their counterparts in manufacturing industries (Carlin and Soskice 2008; 
Hassel 2014; Palier and Thelen 2010; Thelen 2014).  
The insider/outsider model and the related producer coalition approach, displaying 
strong affinities with Varieties of Capitalism theory (Hall and Soskice 2001), are obviously 
built on rational-choice assumptions. A more sociological literature, however, emphasises 
(historical) union identities in order to understand trade union strategies. Hyman (2001) 
distinguishes between three (ideal-typical) trade union identities. Firstly, in business 
unionism, trade unions reduce their role to the representation of somewhat narrow 
occupational interests – and pursue no ‘ultimate ends’ as labour market actors rather than 
wider social or political actors. This identity has also been described ‘pure-and-simple’ 
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unionism and could be seen as corresponding with rational-choice assumptions in 
insider/outsider and producer coalition approaches (that is, manufacturing unions making 
‘deals’ with employers at the expense of outsiders). Secondly, by contrast, it is rather 
difficult to see unions with class identity to enter this sort of coalition with employers. 
Instead, organised labour strives for representing the interests of the entire working class 
and, in a more confrontational manner, business is seen as the ‘enemy’ – with union identity 
formed around a fundamental opposition to employers. Lastly, unions as a broader social 
movement reject simple class antagonism, and instead they perceive a broader role as 
“vehicle for social integration” (ibid, 2). Here, we, of course, see a rather political trade 
union identity in the pursuit of social and economic justice that requires action beyond the 
workplace. Unlike the ideal-typical class union, social movement unionism is more open to 
other actors in civil society, allowing for more comprehensive social and political coalitions 
for social progress. It is worth noting that social movement unionism is often associated 
with democratisation movements (Adler and Webster 1995; Hirschsohn 1998; Lee 2007; Suh 
2009). 
Further insight into trade union strategies is offered by the revitalisation literature 
(Frege and Kelly 2003; Turner 2005). The starting point is that unions face increasing 
pressure to respond to changes in the socio-economic and socio-political environments. 
Critically, we observe a secular trend of declining union membership and diminishing union 
influence in the workplace – both are typically associated with labour market changes and 
the latter also often with globalisation. In addition, unions are under political pressure with 
their legitimacy challenged, especially when perceived as representing an ever smaller set of 
labour market insiders. Whilst insider/outsider and producer coalition theories have a 
narrow rational-choice approach to union behaviour (that is, the protection of insider 
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interests at the expense of outsiders) and essentially perceive organised labour as being 
defensive (especially, with regard to employer strategies), the revitalisation literature 
ascribes strategic capacity to unions, assuming that they have “meaningful proactive 
choices beyond adaptation and subordination” (Turner 2005, 390). Moving beyond common 
assumptions that behaviours are largely determined by institutional and external 
constraints, Frege and Kelly (2003) emphasise framing processes in the understanding of 
trade union strategies – and here, also drawing attention to the role of national union 
leaders as critical agency. Thus, what is a challenge to unions, or put differently a ‘problem,’ 
is not predetermined but depends on framing processes; and this framing is closely linked to 
union identities. For instance, growing insider/outsider differences might not be perceived 
as a problem in business unionism, whereas unions with class and civil society identities can 
be expected to show greater concerns about outsiders. 
 
Labour Market and Social Protection Regime of the Developmental State 
Prior to Korea’s democratisation, the country’s authoritarian state repressed trade unions, 
as disciplined low-cost labour was considered imperative for rapid industrialisation. The 
export-oriented industrialisation project of the so-called developmental state used low 
prices to break into world markets, and the government promoted ‘national champions’ 
(large business conglomerates typically run and controlled by an owner family, the so-called 
chaebols) that could compete internationally. However, instead of outlawing trade unions, 
the authoritarian military regime permitted enterprise unions, which were required to 
affiliate with the government-sanctioned Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). 
Importantly, fragmented enterprise unions, often collaborating with employers, were 
thought to prevent the emergence of a class conscious amongst workers, which could have 
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challenged the authoritarian government. Needless to say that unions were not allowed to 
engage in any political action (Deyo 1987; Koo 2001; Kwon and O'Donnell 1999). In other 
words, the promoted business unionism restricted to narrow workplace issues was a means 
of regime stabilisation, in addition to providing the institutional underpinnings for insider-
focussed strategies in the aftermath of democratisation, as discussed in the following 
section.  
Facilitating the development of large business conglomerates, the state provided 
preferential treatment to selective companies, such as government subsidies and special 
low-interest loans. In exchange for its critical support, government effectively enforced a 
no-lay-off policies at large workplaces, and expected big employers to provide considerable 
company welfare (such as retirement payments, subsidised housing loans and education 
allowances for children) to prevent workers from calling for public social policies. The 
compromise between the state and business allowed core workers (notably, male standard 
workers in large firms) enjoying high levels of job security and generous company welfare 
(Song 2014). This, however, created a dual labour market structure with well protected 
insiders and much more vulnerable workers at the margins of the labour market. The 
core/periphery distinction could also be observed in social protection. The state provided 
only very limited social welfare (primarily health care and occupational accident insurance) 
for workers in key industries which were considered vital for the industrialisation project, in 
addition to civil servants and the military whose loyalty was imperative for the stability of 
the undemocratic regime. Importantly, the state did not provide any unemployment 
protection, which was considered a burden on the economy. Those out of work were 
instead expected to rely on family, in accordance with traditional Confucian values 
(Goodman and Peng 1996; Kwon 1997).  
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In short, social and employment protection, as well as enterprise welfare, only 
benefited a limited number of workers in core industries, whereas the majority of workers 
in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was poorly protected. Intriguingly, despite 
the highly dualised structure of the labour market and social protection that had long been 
a feature of Korea, the country had been characterised by relatively modest social inequality, 
as the government’s wage guidelines limited wage differentials between workers in large 
companies and SMEs; and remarkable economic growth provided sufficient employment 
opportunities to avoid any significant unemployment (Park 2010; Peng and Wong 2010; 
Song 1991). 
 
Protecting Insiders: Trade Unions and Democratisation  
Whilst organised labour was severely repressed during the authoritarian regime, unions 
used their new strength in democratic Korea for achieving wage increases and enterprise 
welfare in excess of the government’s wage guidelines. In the democratic transition of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (with the state no longer having the capacity of supress industrial 
action), unions in chaebol workplaces in particular were remarkably successful in improving 
the pay and working conditions of their members. As an alternative to FKTU, the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) emerged as a competing force for workers’ interest 
representation in the Great Labour Struggle. Displaying greater militancy, KCTU rejected the 
more business-friendly and conciliatory approach of FKTU, which was somewhat tainted by 
its cooperation with the previous military regime. Critically, not only were progressive union 
leaders associated with KCTU, in stark contrast to FKTU, fighting for workers’ interest in the 
workplace but also were typically deeply involved in the democratisation movement and 
strived for economic and social reforms. We therefore find KCTU best characterised as social 
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movement unionism (Gray 2008; Koo 2001; Kwon 2015; Suh 2009), providing the nucleus 
for the observed greater inclusiveness of Korean organised labour in the East Asian financial 
crisis and subsequent labour market dualisation.  
With wage increases exceeding improvements in productivity, employers, especially 
in export-oriented industries, experienced significant pressure on their price 
competitiveness, and in fact claimed that “wage increases unprecedented in the world in 
the last ten years” had undermined the competitiveness of Korean industries, particularly if 
compared to the close competitors in China, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Singapore and Japan 
(Korea Employers Federation 1996, 16; see also Korea Employers Federation 1992). Coping 
with rising labour costs of insiders, large employers started to downscale their internal 
labour markets and made more extensive use of outsourcing and subcontracting to reduce 
costs. In SMEs with much weaker unions, wage increases were relatively modest, and 
therefore the wage gap between workers of large enterprises and those of SMEs widened 
considerably after democratisation. The relative wages (basic salary plus cash bonus) of SME 
workers, measured against those of large-enterprise workers set at 100 percent, dropped 
from 77 percent in 1985 to 65 percent in 1990 (Ministry of Employment and Labour 1991). 
We thus observe a rise of labour market inequality and greater dualism (Peng 2012; Shin 
2010) as a result of changing employer strategies. 
In the environment of rising labour costs, employers, displaying greater political 
agency, increased their pressure on the right-wing government of Kim Young-Sam (1993-98) 
to deregulate the labour market – not only to make it easier to dismiss regular workers for 
managerial reasons but also to make it easier to use irregular workers. Apparently, business 
started to withdraw from the previous compromise of the developmental state and 
proactively mobilised for neo-liberal reform (including the calling into question of de-facto 
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lifetime employment among chaebol employees) (Fleckenstein and Lee 2017). In awareness 
of the new strength of unions and their militancy, the government offered the introduction 
of unemployment protection in exchange for labour market deregulation. The coverage of 
the proposed unemployment insurance was quite selective, excluding labour market 
outsiders who were employed in small firms (with 30 or less workers) and those whose 
employment was atypical (Ministry of Labor 2005). This political exchange was rejected by 
organised labour, for which “unemployment protection was not a priority” (Interview No. 
12), and consenting to labour market deregulation compromising the employment security 
of their members was inconceivable -- in fact,  member unions “did not even allow us [peak 
associations] to talk about it” (Interview No. 1; see also Interview No. 8). After failed 
negotiations, the government resorted to unilateral action and legislated labour market 
deregulation. Both union confederations, which were bitter rivals, called out together a 
general strike, which brought the country to a standstill for a month. In an unprecedented 
manner, the government had to postpone the implementation of labour market reform, 
opening up the possibility of policy reversal by the next government (Koo 2000; Lee 2011b).  
In this early stage of democratisation, we find organised labour, with large company 
unions in the ‘driving seat,’ prioritising employment protection, wage increases and 
enterprise welfare for insiders, whereas the progressive KCTU leadership had too little clout 
and institutional capacity to facilitate more inclusive policies. The mainstream of organised 
labour did not present any meaningful interest in social policy, but believed that their 
interests could be best advanced in the industrial relations arena. Among competing 
theories, this episode corresponds with the insider/outsider model but not the producer 
coalition approach because of unions’ confrontational and militant strategies in the 
workplace.  
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The East Asian Financial Crisis: Labour Market Deregulation and Protecting Outsiders  
The scene changed dramatically with the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, which brought a 
significant increase in the unemployment rate from 2 to 8.5 percent and major bankruptcies 
across the economy (including chaebols, which were previously considered safe havens of 
employment) (Kong 2000). The newly elected centre-left president Kim Dae-Jung (1998-
2003), who had previously fiercely rejected labour market deregulation, saw no alternative 
to labour market reform. Not only considerable pressure from the International Monetary 
Fund but also large-scale foreign capital flight made deregulation appear as an imperative, 
as the rigidity of the labour market was widely considered to make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to restructure failing Korean companies (Haggard, Lim, and Kim 2003). As a 
means to achieve consensual labour market reforms in this extremely difficult economic and 
political situation, Kim Dae-Jung put much emphasis on negotiation in the Tripartite 
Commission, through which the government formally involved organised business and 
labour; and this put the leadership of FKTU and KCTU in a stronger and more prominent 
position as compared to the early stage of democratisation and the Great Labour Struggle, 
when large enterprise unions dominated the movement. In other words, the government’s 
strategy of tripartite concertation strengthened the agency of national confederations. 
Critically, in the Commission, unions, which had categorically rejected labour market 
deregulation in the past, made a radical policy U-turn. The leadership of both labour 
confederations made strategic choices, and was prepared to accept reduced employment 
protection for insiders and the deregulation of fixed-term and temporary agency 
employment in exchange for better social protection for labour market outsiders, in 
addition for improved labour rights (Interview Nos. 8, 13). 
13 
 
Subsequent legislation not only made the individual and collective dismissal of 
workers much easier (as reflected in the OECD Employment Protection Index dropping from 
3.04 to 2.37), it also eased the use of fixed-term workers (where we observe a drop from 
3.13 to 2.13 in the corresponding OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index) 
(OECD.Stat 2016). Great controversy attracted the use of temporary agency work. To limit 
the use of dispatched workers (which were feared to undermine regular employment), 
unions successfully insisted on a so-called ‘positive list’ system, which allowed the use of 
agency workers in listed occupations only but otherwise prohibited it. Unsurprisingly, 
employers strongly pushed for a ‘negative list’ system, which would have allowed them a 
wider use of dispatched workers (Tripartite Commission 1998a; 1998b; see also Interview 
Nos. 1, 13). 
Attempts to minimise labour market deregulation might not come with much 
surprise, but it is rather remarkable, challenging insider/outsider theory, that trade unions 
made improving social protection for outsiders a priority. During the concertation at the 
Commission, the two labour confederations demanded that the rather selective 
unemployment insurance scheme be extended to small firms and irregular workers. In 
particular, KCTU, in correspondence with their identity as a movement for social and 
economic progress for all, took the lead in promoting outsider rights with a more specific 
and comprehensive agenda across almost all areas of social policy. They strongly called for a 
radical relaxation of the contribution requirement of unemployment benefits, so that all the 
unemployed could receive benefits; including those whose short employment record would 
have otherwise disqualified them (notably, non-standard workers). Furthermore, KCTU 
demanded that all the other social insurance schemes (health, occupational accident and 
pensions) be extended to atypical workers, in addition to pressing for a comprehensive 
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social protection system that provided sufficient income security for all citizens (KCTU 1998). 
More specifically, the latter was further developed into a proposal, together with civil 
society organisations, for the expansion of public assistance to labour market outsiders who 
had been disqualified under the old scheme as long as they were deemed fit to work (Moon 
1999). In the domain of active labour market policy (which was historically very poorly 
developed in Korea), KCTU also called for a substantial improvement of training 
programmes for the unemployed. The union criticised that training programmes had been 
geared towards employees of large enterprises and that training for the unemployed was 
very insufficient. Considering the meagre generosity of unemployment benefit (namely, 
strict eligibility criteria and short benefit duration), it was argued that training schemes 
should be put in place to provide income security for labour market outsiders who either 
were not eligible for unemployment benefits or exhausted them (KCTU 1998; see also 
Interview No. 8). Following the lead of KCTU, FKTU also promoted social protection for 
labour market outsiders. Most notably, they demanded the expansion of unemployment 
insurance towards atypical workers (FKTU 1998), which was a profound change from their 
initial position. They had previously argued for the exclusion of irregular workers (especially, 
part-time and temporary workers) from the unemployment insurance scheme, as the 
inclusion of these was thought to undermine the ‘fiscal health’ of the insurance fund (FKTU 
1989; see also Interview No. 12). They also called for better social protection and training 
schemes for outsiders, but their proposals were rather vague, unlike the more specific 
demands put forward by KCTU (FKTU 1998). Yet, both confederations demanded an 
increase of the government welfare budget by 30 percent (ibid; KCTU 1998).    
Whilst the progressive core of KCTU presented a long-standing commitment to 
greater social solidarity, for the understanding of the U-turn of wider parts of organised 
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labour, large-scale bankruptcies during the financial crisis were critical. In fact, progressive 
labour activists used the financial crisis as an opportunity to promote their more inclusive 
agenda in the face of far-reaching changes in Korean employment practices. So, union 
leaders (unlike many enterprise unions) increasingly accepted the ‘new reality’ of the end of 
the de-facto lifetime employment practice; and, more generally, they moved away from the 
idea of social progress for workers primarily through improved pay and working conditions 
in the workplace. The Korean economy displayed an extremely export-oriented growth 
model, which was sensitive to labour costs. Before the crisis, large companies, in addition to 
sub-contracting to SMEs in Korea, had started to relocate production to more price-
competitive countries nearby (especially, to China after it opened up its economy for foreign 
investments in 1992). For this reason, the militant union strategies that produced 
remarkable wage increases and enterprise welfare in early democratic transition were not 
expected to be equally successful in the future – “in the wake of the crisis, KCTU tried to 
shift their emphasis from wage increases at firm level to public welfare policies” (Interview 
No. 9). The changing environment was perceived as making public social welfare an 
increasingly important source for improving living standards of workers throughout their life 
course. In other words, the ‘exit option’ of employers in the ‘era’ of globalisation shifted 
power resources towards business (Fleckenstein and Lee 2017), and unions’ recognition of 
the limits to progress in the industrial relations arena drew attention towards previously 
neglected public social policies (Interview Nos. 2, 9).  
In addition to the socio-economic pressure from the East Asian financial crisis and 
globalisation more generally, Korean unions saw themselves confronted with an increasingly 
critical public. Organised labour, because of their active involvement in the democratisation 
movement, had been generally considered as a positive force in the democratic transition, 
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but unions became to be associated with self-serving behaviour to the benefit of a small 
group of regular workers in large companies while the growing number of irregular workers 
was effectively ignored. Among union leaders, this public pressure produced a sense of an 
existential crisis of the Korean labour movement, which had seen a significant drop in union 
membership during the 1990s. In this situation, they felt an imperative to ‘reinvent’ the 
labour movement to regain political legitimacy and organisational strength. “To address the 
public criticism of self-serving behaviour, the representation of labour market outsiders was 
considered critical” (Interview No. 2) by labour leaders, and accordingly labour 
confederations pressed hard for improved unemployment protection – beyond the 
readiness of the centre-left government (see also Interview Nos. 5, 6, 10). 
Although this episode (that is, unions promoting improved social protection for 
outsiders in exchange for reduced employment protection for insiders) presents quite 
clearly a challenge to conventional insider/outsider theory, it might be read in terms of 
prioritising organisational interests over member interests – labour rights in exchange for 
employment protection, as the compromise at the Tripartite Commission included the 
promise of improved labour rights, including the permission to set up works councils for civil 
servants, the full legalisation of political activities of trade unions and the legalisation of 
teachers unions (Tripartite Commission 1998b). However, this interpretation, along the lines 
of the modified insider/outsider model, fails to grasp the full dynamics of Korean labour 
market and social protection reform. Most importantly, the approach assumes that trade 
unions would only (reluctantly though) sacrifice the interests of outsiders but, in any case, 
defend the interests of insiders. Obviously, the trade union consent to compromising insider 
rights in exchange for better social protection for outsiders cannot be captured by this 
alternative approach. Also, though the recognition of teachers unions was commonly 
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thought to be particularly important to KCTU, it is nonetheless difficult to make this key for 
KCTU’s acceptance of labour market deregulation. Studies drawing on qualitative evidence 
support the argument that the KCTU leadership saw the crisis as an opportunity to exchange 
greater labour market flexibility for an expansion of social welfare to the benefit of the 
wider population in correspondence with their social movement identity (Chang 2009, 
Neary 2000).  
Instead of relying on any insider/outsider model (conventional or modified) 
assuming clear-cut membership and/or organisational interests driving the pursuit of insider 
interests, unions need to be understood as organisations that have the ability to respond 
proactively to changes in their socio-economic and socio-political environment; and here 
the East Asian financial crisis served as a critical trigger for re-thinking not only policy but 
also the current and future strategic capacity of unions. Besides the key issue of the 
perceived functional feasibility of the old system of de-facto lifetime employment and the 
limits to achieving wage increases and improvements in enterprise welfare as in the years 
prior to the financial crisis, unions apparently responded to political pressure from outside 
their organisations, and the notion of ‘reinventing’ trade unions points to the revitalisation 
rationale of union strategies. In this context, it is critical to highlight the organisational 
identity of union leaders. Especially the KCTU leadership, with its links to civil society 
organisations in the democratisation movement, considered itself as part of a social 
movement with a wider political and social agenda. In fact, the ‘struggle for social reform’ 
was considered a key dimension of the democratic union movement; and KCTU explicitly 
rejected FKTU’s historical, narrow business unionism of collaboration with employers, solely 
for gains in the workplace. Having said that, whilst still displaying a more pragmatic 
approach than KCTU, FKTU (without the legacy of social movement unionism) presented 
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here in principle the same policy positions as KCTU (Interview Nos. 4, 5, 6, 9, 10). This 
change in FKTU’s policy position from the late 1980s, as discussed above, is significant – also 
because FKTU is generally considered more conservative and favouring selective social 
protection (Wong 2004; Gray 2008). Yet, in addition to a political climate in which the 
conditions of irregular workers became a major issue that could not be ignored easily, 
“increased competition [for members] between the two labour confederations” (Interview 
No. 4) can be seen as pushing FKTU towards the left (though, in practice, maintaining a 
more conciliatory approach and greater readiness for compromise in correspondence with 
their historical business unionism). Thus, despite lacking the legacy of social movement 
unionism, FKTU experienced considerable pressure for the revision of long-established 
positions (Interview Nos. 4, 10, 11); and, whilst not disappearing, we observe a diminishing 
inter-union cleavage as far as the two labour confederations are concerned.  
At the same time, the concessions made in the Tripartite Commission created intra-
union cleavages -- a serious schism between confederations and their enterprise unions 
(especially, powerful chaebol unions). The issue of social protection for outsiders did not 
attract much controversy, but the acceptance of reduced employment protection for 
insiders sparked fierce conflict within the labour movement. This was particularly true for 
KCTU, where the leadership faced a challenge from large enterprise unions. Eventually, a 
more ‘radical’ leadership was installed, which led to KCTU’s formal withdrawal from the 
Tripartite Commission. Nevertheless, KCTU, due to their greater ability to mobilise large-
scale strikes and rallies than the FKTU, continued to play a key role in concertation on labour 
market reform and championed better social protection and labour rights (Interview Nos. 1, 
8, 10, 11).  Although the change in KCTU leadership might not have produced much 
substantive change, it manifested that large enterprise unions were not prepared to give up 
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the prioritisation of insider interests. Labour confederations were not strong enough to instil 
a wider notion of social solidarity. Lee and Frenkel (2004) note that many shop stewards 
lack a sense of solidarity beyond their membership and evidence from our interviews also 
echo such views as labour activists lament that “standard workers lack solidarity with non-
standard workers” (Interview No. 14; see also Interview No. 15). This was a considerable 
problem for KCTU, which organises some of the most militant enterprise unions prioritising 
insider interests. Hence, paradoxically, the more inclusive and socially progressive KCTU 
leadership, grounded in their organisational identity, saw itself confronted with rather 
narrow-minded enterprise unions which might have rejected FKTU’s business-friendly 
approach but still prioritised gains at the workplace level. In other words, KCTU’s member 
unions were often somewhat reluctant to support their leadership’s wider agendas and 
political activism (see also Lee 2011b).  
Unlike the observations in the early stages of democratisation, we find trade unions, 
pushed by the leadership in confederations, displaying the capacity to develop new 
strategies in response to changes in their socio-economic and socio-political environment. In 
particular, the KCTU leadership, rooted in their identity as a social movement, can be 
considered an agenda-setter for social policy reform. Progressive union leaders used the 
economic and social crisis as an opportunity to promote their more inclusive ideas within 
the movement, which more broadly increasingly arrived at the conclusion of the exhaustion 
of previous union strategies. Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that the social policy U-turn 
was constrained by the institutional structures of Korean industrial relations. Pressure ‘from 
below,’ namely opposition from some enterprise unions in large workplaces (complying with 
insider/outsider theory), prevented a more comprehensive change in preferences and 
behaviours.  
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In the Aftermath of Deregulation (I): Representing Irregular Workers in the Workplace  
Labour market deregulation had huge impact on the Korean labour market. The 
unemployment rate recovered fairly swiftly to the pre-crisis level, but we observe an 
acceleration of dualisation with a huge increase in irregular employment, a widening wage 
gap and an associated rise in social inequality (Song 2014; Shin 2010). After labour market 
deregulation, the number of irregular workers, for instance, increased rather quickly by 
around 1.3 million (from 5.7 million in 1996 to 7.0 million in 2000), whereas regular 
employment decreased by 1.1 million (from 7.5 to 6.4 million) (Statistics Korea 2016). In 
principle, unions could be seen as having two basic strategic options in response to 
dualisation. First, in correspondence with insider/outsider theory, insider unions can seek 
(implicit or explicit) producer coalitions with employers. For the sake of competitiveness of 
their companies, they accept the use of atypical workers at the margins as long as this 
secures their own jobs. Alternatively, unions, in recognition that shrinking internal labour 
markets undermine their organisational capacity, can pursue revitalisation strategies; that is 
proactively opening up their organisations to outsiders.  
In the face of the social crisis that was associated with deregulation and dualisation, 
both confederations and industry unions, building on the paradigm shift during the East 
Asian financial crisis, showed increasing awareness of the importance of social policy for 
progress in the living conditions of workers. However, unions continued to struggle with the 
narrow interests of many regular workers who did not have, for instance, much interest in 
unemployment protection as long as they considered their jobs safe. In other words, the 
earlier identified schism between peak organisations and enterprise unions persisted. 
Having said that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, increased employment insecurity 
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also affected labour market insiders. Unprecedented levels of job insecurity (for both 
insiders and outsiders) absorbed enormous union resources in the workplace, making it 
more difficult to maintain momentum for promoting the broader social reform agenda; but 
it also opened up reflections in some enterprise unions with respect to their approach 
towards atypical employment in their companies. In any case, in these difficult 
circumstances, peak organisations did not manage to mobilise sufficient organisational 
resources to pursue their social reform agenda in a more meaningful manner (Interview Nos. 
2, 6, 7, 9). 
Instead, responding to the observed far-reaching changes in the labour market (that 
is, dualisation as well as increased job insecurity for many insiders), unions re-focussed on 
industrial relations but also made significant efforts to strengthen labour market regulation 
in the face of an excessive use of irregular workers. To some extent, though, these were 
viewed differently within organised labour; and again the dividing line can be found 
between company unions, on the one hand, and national confederations and industrial 
unions, on the other hand, as discussed before. Many enterprise unions continued to look at 
atypical employment rather favourably. Not only did ‘cheap labour’ make their companies 
more competitive, irregular workers were also considered “buffers” (Interview Nos. 2 and 
14) – in difficult times, they are dismissed first and thus absorbed shocks so that regular 
workers could keep their jobs (see also Interview Nos. 4 and 10). By contrast, the two labour 
confederations and industrial unions increasingly perceived high levels of irregular 
employment not only as a social problem but also as a “serious crisis for the labour 
movement” (Interview No. 15) – reinforcing the earlier perceived imperative of 
revitalisation. Besides the core belief that unions ought to protect both insiders and 
outsiders, the shrinking of internal labour markets as a result of dualisation also raised “the 
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question of the organisational strength and survival of unions as a meaningful social force” 
(Interview No. 2) with the vast majority of union members coming from shrinking internal 
labour markets. In other words, the decline of standard employment eroded the 
conventional power base of organised labour, threatening their capacity to remain as a 
relevant movement. In fact, some might argue unions had already entered a stage where 
the issue had become regaining the status of a meaningful social force. Furthermore, the 
widening gap between standard and non-standards workers was seen as “a barrier to 
achieving standard workers’ demands for better wages and working conditions” (Interview 
No. 5), if irregular workers were available so much more cheaply. In this context, union 
leaders considered the mobilisation and recruitment of atypical workers beyond their core 
membership imperative; not only for normative claims to represent the entire working class 
but also as a matter of ‘survival’ (Interview Nos. 4, 2, 5, 6, 15). 
Recognising the limits of the enterprise unions and decentralised collective 
bargaining system for both union members and unorganised workers in the aftermath of 
the East Asian financial crisis, union leaders, including some leaders of enterprise unions, 
started pushing more seriously for industrial unions in the early 2000s – these had actually 
been a long-term goal of the democratic labour movement. Apparently, enterprise unions 
started to respond to increasing pressure in the workplace, as particularistic strategies had 
become ever more difficult. Thus, institutional reform addressing the inherent deficiencies 
of the Korean industrial relations system became an organisational priority. KCTU (with 
about 70 percent of their members) had been more successful than FKTU (with about 35 
percent of their members) in centralising their membership in industrial unions. Yet, 
progress towards (meaningful) sectoral collective bargaining was limited; not only by 
employer opposition but also by some significant reluctance by enterprise unions in many 
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chaebol workplaces. Thus, with weak organisational capacity of labour confederations and 
little coordination between sectoral and enterprise levels, collective bargaining at the 
workplace level remained dominant, and enterprise unions (especially in large workplaces), 
as in social protection, continued to show limited interest in representing the interest of 
non-standard workers, which were the first to be dismissed in difficult times. Hence, despite 
some progress with industrial unions, outsiders remained poorly represented in many 
workplaces, as unions struggled to incorporate workers at the periphery of the labour 
markets into their organisations. Responding to the union representation gap, irregular 
workers, often struggling to join enterprise unions, started to organise separate unions for 
better representation of their interests. We observed an increase of new unions that do not 
belong to either FKTU or KCTU, and that cover about 20 percent of all unionised workers 
(Kwon 2015; Lee 2011b; Suh 2007).  
The limited representation of outsiders in organised labour means that irregular 
workers have greatly relied on social movement organisations outside their workplace for 
interest representation, and we find a rising public awareness for the hardship of labour 
market outsiders (Shin 2013). Also, as signs of growing desperation, labour market outsiders 
(as in fact insiders in the face of weakening unions) increasingly resort to very extreme 
forms of protest outside the industrial relations regime, such as so-called ‘sky protests’ on 
cranes, chimneys and radio towers, to gain public and media attention for their cause, 
hoping this would put external pressure on their employers – in times of declining 
conventional labour disputes (Lee 2015). 
For the understanding of the difficulties in organising and representing atypical 
workers, the metalworking sector and especially its automobile industry present interesting 
cases, because metalworking is the stronghold of KCTU as well as the home of many large 
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chaebol unions where a strong prioritisation of insider interests can be found (including 
Hyundai Motors’ and Kia Motors’ labour unions, which are often considered typical unions 
in the sector). Although irregular workers in manufacturing, with their increasing integration 
in core production functions, have in principle considerable potential to disrupt production 
(i.e. the potential to develop industrial strength), new interest representation through 
separate unions failed to develop momentum. Not only is the organisation of irregular 
workers undermined by the instability of their employment, but also by “the great hostility 
from employers” (Interview No. 6), which typically refused to accept these new unions as 
negotiation partners. This leaves non-standard workers, which commonly hope for 
conversion into regular employment, incredibly vulnerable, as militancy in the workplace 
might damage their chances of becoming insiders. For this reason, many outsiders (despite 
having little trust in enterprise unions) still prefer interest representation by established 
insider unions, which have often become somewhat more sympathetic towards the salary 
demands of their colleagues at the margins of the labour market. And indeed, in the face of 
the ever growing size of non-standard employment after the East Asian economic crisis and 
pressure from union leaders, enterprise unions in the metalworking sector have started to 
show some interest in representing irregular workers; and have started to negotiate on 
behalf of irregular workers who are not their members, as they pressed management to 
contain the use of irregular workers. This greater inclusiveness in the workplace, however, is 
still constrained by insiders’ core interest in secure employment. Insiders are not prepared 
to give up on the subordination of their non-standard colleagues in workplace practice, and 
expect these to absorb fluctuations in labour demand. Thus, enterprise unions do not show 
much support for the conversion of non-standard workers into regular workers (Lee and 
Frenkel 2004; Lee 2011a; see also Interview No. 6).  
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The limits to inclusiveness is also reflected in many enterprise unions’ persistent 
reluctance to accept irregular workers as their members, as demanded not only by irregular 
workers but also the Korean Metal Workers Union (a KCTU member union) to enhance the 
strength of organised labour and to better represent irregular workers. Labour market 
insiders seem aware that this greater inclusiveness might compromise their employment 
conditions, especially as this might make it more difficult to dismiss non-standard colleagues. 
However, strong pressure from the union leadership on company unions “has started to 
make some difference” (Interview No. 6), and the leadership’s genuine strong commitment 
to the rights of non-standard workers is well documented, for instance, by the union’s 
expulsion of the enterprise union of Hyundai Heavy Industry (the world’s largest 
shipbuilding company with some 20,000 unionised workers in Korea) for their abusive 
behaviour towards non-standard workers. More recently, however, company unions in the 
shipbuilding industry, where massive restructuring put pressure on the job security of 
insiders, show greater support for the organising of non-standard workers (Interview No. 6). 
As before, we observe that enterprise unions become more responsive to pressure from the 
leadership when the interests of the core are threatened as well, especially when employers 
appear unwilling to enter protective producer coalitions at the expense of those at the 
margins of the labour market.  
Economic crisis as major driver for the transformation of enterprise unions, in 
addition to pressure from union leadership, is also confirmed when looking at the banking 
sector, where we find FKTU as the dominant union confederation (including the 
representation of workers in the so-called ‘Big Five’; namely Nonghyup, Kookmin, Shinham, 
Woori and Hana). The East Asian financial crisis resulted in the laying off of some 50,000 
workers, and the majority of these positions were filled with non-standard workers who had 
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to accept not only little job security but also much poorer pay and benefit packages. The 
massive increase in non-standard workers was perceived as a threat to organised labour; 
not only by FKTU but also by company unions, which conceded the necessity to recruit 
irregular workers and to promote an industry union (that is, the Korean Financial Industry 
Union) in order to remain an organisation that had the capacity to challenge management. 
It was explicitly acknowledged that one “cannot carry on to fight capital as company unions” 
(Interview No. 7), but required strategic coordination at the industry level.  
With the limited room for progress in the political arena (especially, after the 
political right returned to power in 2008 with greater hostility towards labour), industrial 
relations remained the focal point for social progress. In particular, KCTU’s commitment to 
greater solidarity between labour market insiders and outsiders is reflected in changes in 
the union’s wage policy that demands significant improvements in the minimum wage and 
the lump-sum wage increases for all workers at the expense of conventional percentage-
point increases. This new ‘solidarity wage’ policy, coming from the union’s leadership and 
put in place since 2013, was explicitly justified with the objective “to close the wage gap 
between standard and non-standard workers” (Interview No. 3; and KCTU 2016); and it 
hence represents, in a core business of unions, a fundamental challenge to the conventional 
assumption that organised labour prioritises the interests of labour market insiders. 
In summary, in the aftermath of labour market deregulation, we observe some 
important improvements in the representation of outsiders in the workplace with 
enterprise unions responding not only to pressure from union leaders but also to the rise in 
irregular employment threatening the previously secure position of insiders. Dualisation 
increasingly affects insiders as well, and these develop a sense of crisis too (in the face of 
successive hollowing out of the core, and a deterioration of pay and benefits for insiders). 
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Having said that, whilst these developments might undermine producer coalitions, in the 
face of ever more aggressive employer strategies, and make enterprise unions reconsider 
their strategies, insider/outsider cleavages remain and the institutional structure of Korean 
industrial relations continues to hinder greater inclusiveness where company unions have 
the capacity to resist the pressure from union leadership. In any case, the presented 
evidence makes it difficult to challenge union leaders’ genuine commitment to the 
improvement of the working and living conditions of irregular workers.  
 
In the Aftermath of Deregulation (II): Representing Irregular Workers in Public Policy  
Growing public concerns about the massive increase in irregular employment and the gap 
between labour market insiders and outsiders made dualisation and associated social 
inequality an important political issue (Shin 2010; Song 2014). We observed the emergence 
of a broad ‘Alliance for Non-Standard Workers’ consisting of 26 civil society organisations 
including both labour confederations. The formation of this social movement, which grew to 
more than 100 organisations over time, reflects a public sentiment that considers the wide-
spread use of non-standard workers and their poor conditions a major social problem. In 
October 2000, the Alliance submitted a petition to the National Assembly, calling for the 
limitation of the reasons allowing irregular employment and calling for the ‘equal pay for 
equal work’ principle as key demands to improve the living and working conditions of 
atypical workers (Alliance for Non-Standard Workers 2000).  
Unions elaborated these positions in the Tripartite Commission, which formed a sub-
commission to address the problem of irregular employment (Tripartite Commission 2003; 
Interview Nos. 2, 4, 10; see also Lee and Eun 2009 for further details on Tripartite 
Commission and the legislative process). Despite being very keen to introduce new 
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legislation regulating non-standard employment, the centre-left Roh Moo-Hyun government 
(2003-8), adopting an employer-friendly position, categorically rejected the demand of 
limiting the reasons for the use of irregular workers. Although there was no fundamental 
difference in the two labour confederations’ principle positions, the FKTU was prepared, in 
line with their historically more ‘pragmatic’ approach and unlike the KCTU, for a 
compromise (most notably, legislation that limits the maximum duration of fixed-term 
employment rather than limits the reasons permitting such employment), when it became 
clear that legislators considered union demands unrealistic. Thus, FKTU arrived at the 
conclusion that “inadequate legislation was better than no legislation” (Interview No. 4), 
and the government offered to limit fixed-term employment to three years. Towards the 
end of the legislative process, the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, a leading 
civil society organisation and a key force in the Alliance for Non-Standard Workers, gave up 
its fundamental opposition and implicitly supported a compromise, since this was 
considered “the only option to achieve any legislation” (Interview No. 11). This triggered 
KCTU to propose a one-year limit, though showing no sign of compromising on their 
fundamental position to limit the reasons for fixed-term employment (see also Interview 
Nos. 9, 10, 14). Because of the continued strong opposition from KCTU, the Tripartite 
Commission failed to produce a compromise. However, still keen on introducing legislation, 
the government offered more concessions to organised labour and proposed a two-year 
limit on fixed-term employment instead of the initial proposal of three years, in addition to 
maintaining the positive list for temporary agency work (rather than the earlier proposal of 
a negative list, which was opposed by unions). Also, the government accepted the non-
discrimination principle for irregular workers, instead of the initial government proposal to 
allow ‘rational’ discrimination, which was fiercely rejected by unions. After six years of 
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negotiation, the non-standard employment legislation passed in 2006, with support from 
the major opposition parties and implicit approval from KCTU. 
Shortly, after the implementation of the legislation, the new right-wing Lee Myung-
Bak government (2008-13), entering office with a comprehensive deregulation agenda, 
sought to make the use of irregular workers easier (e.g. allowing four years of fixed-term 
employment), but the government met fierce opposition from unions and civil society 
groups, as the following right-wing Park Geun-Hye government (2013-17) pressed for 
further labour market deregulation. Whilst unions and civil society organisations were able 
to block attempts by these governments to deregulate the labour market, at the same time 
(in this political environment) they were obviously not in a position to achieve any better 
protection of irregular workers with the Lee and Park governments taking business-friendly 
positions (Lee 2016; Lee and Eun 2009). It should be noted however that their prevention of 
further deregulation (especially, the relaxation of temporary agency employment) suggests 
that organised labour has developed into a de-facto veto player in labour market reform, 
even during the rule of the political right with little meaningful access to political decision-
makers (cf. Tsebelis 1995 on veto player theory).  
 
Conclusions 
The presented evidence from the Korean case challenges insider/outsider and producer 
coalition theories with their narrow approach to trade union preferences and strategies. 
Unions have the ability to overcome the representation of narrow insider interests; and 
rather than being ‘complicit’ in dualisation and rising social inequality, the Korean case 
suggests that trade unions’ preference formation is a far more complex process and that 
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unions have the capacity to act strategically in response to changes in their socio-economic 
and socio-political environment. 
We have shown that KCTU’s identity as a social movement (that is, striving for social 
justice and progress for all) was critical when challenging the representation of narrow 
insider interests in the East Asian financial crisis; and KCTU leaders, in the economic and 
social crisis, became an agenda-setter for better social protection and representation of 
outsiders. Both KCTU and FKTU actually arrived at the conclusion that the old strategy of 
social progress through workplace level negotiations (that is, better wages and enterprise 
welfare) had become increasingly difficult under conditions of globalisation and declining 
union strength at the company level. For this reason, strategically, public social policies 
gained more importance to improve the lives of not only labour market outsiders but also 
insiders. Furthermore, KCTU and FKTU agreed that the secular process of shrinking internal 
labour markets (traditionally the main pool for union members) and the corresponding 
decline in union membership raised the issue of organisational capacity for a meaningful 
representation of workers’ interests. Thus, greater inclusiveness towards irregular workers 
was most certainly also seen as a revitalisation strategy to remain a capable social force, 
which was furthermore challenged by a public perception that unions prioritised insiders 
whereas ignoring the hardship of the growing number of outsiders. In this environment, 
union leaders consented to labour market deregulation for both outsiders and insiders 
(which was believed could not be stopped anyway) dependent on better unemployment 
protection for outsiders – considerably beyond the readiness of the centre-left Kim Dae-
Jung government. In this very difficult situation, social protection for outsiders was 
prioritised when the government had to make concessions for labour market deregulation. 
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Interestingly, although FKTU did not share KCTU’s social movement identity, it made 
a policy U-turn for a better representation of irregular workers in response to the discussed 
changes in the political and socio-economic environments. In the past, greater social 
protection for irregular workers was rejected on the grounds of the ‘fiscal health’ of social 
insurance programmes, which might be seen as being perfectly compatible with business 
unionism. In the face of growing public criticism and competition with KCTU in particular, 
this position was no longer feasible. Yet, strategic differences between the two movements 
remained with FKTU being much more prepared to compromise with the government. This 
one might want to relate the legacy of more pragmatic business unionism. Also, comparing 
the levels of commitment to better social protection of outsiders, one finds that KCTU, with 
its deep roots in social movement unionism, displayed much greater activism for social 
policy expansion, including the collaboration with civil society organisations and including 
the preparation of much more specific policy proposals, whereas FKTU often remained 
somewhat vague. Hence, despite similar if not the same pressures, important differences, 
grounded in different (historical) union identities, can be observed between KCTU and FKTU.  
Despite much greater inclusiveness of organised labour, we certainly cannot ignore 
that significant problems in the representation of outsiders remain; and the pay and 
working conditions of many irregular workers are still extraordinarily precarious, as social 
inequality remains alarmingly high. A more comprehensive and effective approach was not 
only undermined by hostile employers but also large enterprise unions, of which many 
continued to prioritise the interests of core workforces and, in fact, often did not allow 
irregular workers to join company unions. This resistance at the company level is of 
considerable importance in Korea’s very fragmented industrial relations, pointing to the 
significance of institutional structures presenting barriers to social change. But, union 
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leaders have recognised this weakness in the institutional set-up of Korean labour relations 
and have started to push for stronger industry unions, in addition to increasing pressure on 
enterprise unions to better represent irregular workers. Without any question, trade unions 
have been struggling to achieve greater inclusiveness and much work needs to be done, but 
this should not deflect from organised labour’s capacity to respond strategically to socio-
economic and socio-political challenges.   
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